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The ECB Monetary Policy and the Current 
Financial Crisis  




Our paper presents estimates of Taylor type rules for the euro area using quarterly data 
for the period 2004(Q4) to 2008(Q3). Unlike other studies, we employ a real-time data set 
using the quarterly ECB staff projections on inflation and output growth. Estimated real-
time rules are also compared with a more conventional specification whereby ex-post 
data are employed. Our results suggest that: (i) the ECB monetary policy strategy can be 
represented with a simple interest-rate rule; (ii) the ECB takes into account the quarterly 
ECB staff projections when deciding on its monetary policy stance; (iii) the 
accommodative behaviour of the ECB often cited in the literature is related to differences 
between real-time and ex-post data; and (iv) the estimated simple interest-rate rule 
continues to capture the ECB monetary policy strategy during the recent financial crisis.  
In light of the above, we can draw three important policy conclusions. First, the ECB has 
a stabilising role in the economy. Second, the ECB has become rather hawkish in its 
monetary policy decision making, responding more to projected changes in inflation 
than to projected changes in the output growth gap. Finally, the ECB’s response during 
the recent financial crisis of reducing its interest rate to 1.00% by the first half of 2009 
and undertaking non-standard measures to provide support to the financial sector is 
shown to be equivalent to following a simple interest-rate rule based on its previous 
practices. 
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1.  Introduction 
Monetary policy rules, whereby a central bank adjusts its policy instruments in 
response to changes in the macroeconomic environment, have become quite popular 
within the literature framework over the last decade. In his seminal paper, Taylor (1993) 
calibrated a monetary policy rule to describe the US monetary policy strategy. Since 
then, it has often been argued that monetary policy decisions can be described within 
the context of a Taylor type rule. Whilst numerous studies have focused on estimating 
this type of rule for the US economy, only a few have assessed the policy of the newly 
formed ECB, mostly due to the small time series available for the euro area. 
The ECB began its operation in June 1998 following the introduction of the euro 
in the EMU countries. Its major objective as stated in the Treaty on European Union, 
Article 127, paragraph 1, is to deliver price stability and low levels of inflation1. Given, 
though, that monetary policy decisions can affect real activity in the short term, the ECB 
should avoid generating excessive fluctuations in output and employment if this is in 
line with the pursuit of its primary objective. In this respect, we can describe the 
monetary policy in the euro area by a Taylor type rule where interest rates respond to 
deviations of inflation and output from their long-term trend.  
The objective of the present study is to contribute to the understanding of the 
ECB monetary policy strategy by inferring interest-rate rules similar to those estimated 
for the Fed. Given that interest rate changes affect the macroeconomy with a 
considerable time lag, we attempt to examine how policy decisions are related to 
forecasts of inflation and output and how these compare when ex-post data are used 
instead.  
Unlike other Taylor rule studies for the euro area, we employ quarterly real-time 
data using the ECB staff projections on inflation and output growth available to the ECB 
at the time of deciding on its monetary policy. In light of the fact that the ECB Staff 
projections have only been publicly available since the second quarter of 2004, our 
sample estimation period includes only the term of the current President of the ECB, 
                                                            
1 The Governing Council of the ECB aims at a year-on-year increase of the harmonised consumer price index 
(HICP) for the euro area below but close to 2% over the medium term. 3 
 
Jean Claude Trichet, that is, between 2004(Q4) and 2008(Q3). In addition, the sample 
period deliberately excludes the onset of the recent financial crisis. This is crucial in our 
investigation of whether the ECB followed the same monetary policy strategy during the 
financial crisis as the one implemented in the years preceding the Lehman Brothers 
collapse. 
 Despite the short time span used and the caveats that come with it, we find that; 
(i) the ECB’s behaviour can be represented with a simple interest-rate rule; (ii) the real-
time ECB Staff projections on inflation and output are an important input to the ECB’s 
interest rate decision making; (iii) the accommodative behaviour of the ECB suggested 
by some authors in the literature can be attributed to the use of ex-post rather than real-
time data; and (iv) the estimated simple interest-rate rule also captures the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy during the crisis. From the above we can draw three important 
policy conclusions.  First, the ECB has a stabilising role in the economy. Second, the ECB 
is rather hawkish when setting its monetary policy strategy. And last, the use of both 
standard and non-standard measures during the recent crisis was equivalent to as if it 
following a simple interest-rate rule based on its previous profile.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical 
background of the Taylor rule and summarises the findings of the existing literature on 
the euro area. Section 3 provides a description of the data set employed. Section 4 
contains estimates of the ECB’s interest-rate rule and out-of-sample forecasts for the 
ECB’s monetary policy strategy during the financial crisis. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
In his seminal paper, Taylor (1993) introduced an interest-rate policy rule 
representing US monetary policy decisions. In the Taylor rule, the short-term real 
interest rate is adjusted to changes in economic conditions so as to achieve both its short-
run goal of economic stabilisation and the long-run goal of price stability. The rule is 
expressed as:  4 
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where   ̂  refers to the Taylor rule rate in period  ,     is the equilibrium real interest rate, 
         is the deviation of inflation in period t from its target rate    and         and  is 
the deviation of output growth in period t from its potential   , or output gap      . The 
equilibrium nominal interest rate        is equal to the equilibrium real interest rate plus the 
target rate of inflation. 
Taylor assumes that the inflation target and real equilibrium interest rates are at 
2%, and that the Fed places equal weight on both inflation and output deviations from 
their target rate (     1        0.5 .  The rule recommends that monetary policy should 
be tighter whenever inflation is above its target rate or above its full employment level. 
The fact that the coefficient for inflation is positive and greater than 1 indicates that the 
rule is stabilising. That is, given that private decisions are driven by changes in the real 
interest rate, the nominal interest rate should increase by more than the increase in 
inflation to ensure an increase in the real interest rate. 
Surprisingly, although there was no consensus about the size of the coefficients 
and no underlying econometric estimation behind it, the rule closely approximated the 
Federal Reserve’s policy. Since then, it has been widely used to explain monetary policy 
in other central banks with similar monetary policy regimes, albeit with similar 
refinements.    
First, the rule described in equation 1 has a backward-looking specification as it 
employs realised outcomes of inflation and output gap.  Such backward-looking rules 
have been criticised on the grounds that, at the time of monetary policy formation, 
central bankers focus on expected rather than past or current behaviour of inflation and 
output given the lagged effects of monetary policy. Forward looking policy rules were 
first analysed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). The specific formulation is expressed 
as: 
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where     …    denotes the expectation operator,     ,  is the average output gap between 
period  t  and  t+q,    ,  is the inflation rate between periods t and t+k and    is the 
information up to time t.  The equation here is set in a forward-looking manner with 
interest rates adjusting to the future expectations of the inflation and output gap.  
Further to the argument that forward looking rules are better representatives of 
the central banks’ monetary policy decision making, Orphanides (2001a) argues that 
forward looking ex-post data cannot accurately capture the real-time dimension of a 
central bank decision given that the data are usually subject to significant revisions. 
Correct estimates could be obtained if one included only the information available at the 
time the decision was made.   
Second, the simple Taylor rule assumes that deviations of inflation and output 
from their targeted rate will be immediately reflected in the short-run real interest rate. 
According to Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000), however, central bankers avoid 
reacting too quickly to changes in the economic environment and often appear to adjust 
interest rates gradually towards a desired setting in the future. This is to ensure that 
market expectations remain well anchored. To capture this interest rate smoothing the 
actual interest rate is assumed to partially adjust to the target interest rate according to 
the equation  
 ̂     1                ̂                  ( 3 )  
 where the parameter    0,1  captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. Combining 
the target model (2) with the partial adjustment mechanism (3) yields: 
 ̂     1               , |Ω            1            ,  Ω         ̂              (4)  
  Table 1 summarises the findings of several papers on Taylor rule reaction 
functions estimated, particularly for the euro area under the assumption of partial 
adjustment. The results suggest that when ex-post data are used (backward looking 6 
 
specification) the ECB is found to have a destabilising role in the economy given the 
small reaction to both inflation and output growth gap movements. On average, the 
estimated reaction to inflation and output growth gap movements is to increase the ECB 
interest rate by 0.75 percentage points and 0.86 percentage points, respectively.  Even 
though the ECB responds to a sudden increase in inflation and output gap by increasing 
the nominal interest rate, this increase is not enough to ensure a simultaneous increase 
in the real interest rate. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
  In contrast, when forward-looking data is employed, the average reaction to 
inflation and output growth gap movements increases to 1.92 percentage points and 1.11 
percentage points, respectively. Thus the existing literature on forward looking rules 
suggests that the ECB has a stabilising effect both in terms of inflation and output. At the 
same time it tends to react strongly to variations in the inflation rate but much less to 
output variations. This is consistent with the ECB’s primary objective of maintaining 
price stability in the medium term. 
    
 
3.  The Data  
In order to shed more light on the relevance of a forward looking specification 
for the ECB’s reaction to inflation and output gap movements, we employ quarterly real-
time data for the period 2004(Q4) to 2008(Q3). Our dependent variable is chosen to be 
the ECB’s main refinancing operations (MRO) rate, recorded at the end of each quarter. 
Monetary policy cannot influence the market interest rate directly but rather the ECB 
signals a change in the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) through a change in the 
MRO rate.  Chart 1 shows the close relationship between the two rates, with the EONIA 
rate nicely tracking the path of the MRO. The last year seems to be an exception and one 
may argue that the fluctuations observed in the EONIA rate in 2008 reflected the onset 
of the financial crisis.  
 
[Insert Chart 1] 7 
 
3.1.  The construction of the data set 
 
Real-time expected inflation2 and output growth time series for the euro area 
have been constructed from the ECB Staff Projection exercises. These exercises are 
performed on a quarterly basis and provide annual growth rate forecasts of inflation and 
output for the current and the year ahead. Although the ECB has established in 1999, the 
sample period is shorter due to the fact that the ECB didn’t begin publishing its 
quarterly staff projections until the second quarter of 2004.  To construct real-time data 
for every quarter of a given year, we define the expectation of inflation and output 
growth to be the average of the current and the year ahead forecasts3. Table 2 shows an 
example on how time series data have been constructed. The expectation for the first 
quarter of 2005 is defined to be the average of the 2005 and 2006 ECB staff forecasts, 
whilst the expectation for the last quarter of 2005 is defined to be the average of the 2006 
and 2007 ECB staff forecasts4. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Given the absence of a consistent output gap forecast by the ECB, we construct 
implied forecasts of the output growth gap by deducting an estimate of the annual 
potential growth rate from the forecasted GDP growth rate following Jansson and 
Vredin (2003) and Gorter et all (2007).  The potential growth rate was set to 2.0%5, 
following the ECB’s reports of a potential growth for the euro area of 2 to 2.5% per 
annum (ECB 2001, 2002)6.  
                                                            
2 The ECB defines inflation as the year-on-year increase in the harmonised consumer price index (HICP). 
3  In the last quarter of each year, the ECB publishes staff projections on inflation and output growth for the 
current, one and two years ahead     ,    ,    . Given, however, that the ECB sets its monetary policy for the 
medium term, and that the projection for the current year is really the projection of the last quarter, the 
estimation of the real-time data from the December projection exercises includes the average of the two 
years ahead forecasts only and thus excludes the current year projections.  
 
                      /2      
        1,                                    2004  ,2005  ,2006  ,2007  ,2008   ,2009   
      ,                                                                                                                                          
whereby τ = 2004, 2005, …, 2009 and T = 2004(Q4), 2005(Q1), …, 2009(Q4) 
 
4   See Appendix A and B for more analysis on the construction of real-time data. 
5 A limitation of using a fixed potential growth is that it only changes the point estimate of the constant from 
the regression estimate. 
6 In addition the Conference Board of the Global Economic Outlook 2010 and Beyond (November 2009) 
suggests euro area potential output growth to be, on average, 1.95% during the period 2000 – 2008. 8 
 
An inflation target rate of 1.8% has also been imposed as a quantitative definition 
of price stability following the ECB’s remit to maintain inflation below but close to 2.0% 
over the medium term7. 
For comparison purposes, ex-post data are also used to estimate backward 
looking Taylor rules. Quarterly data on ex-post HICP inflation and real GDP are 
obtained from Eurostat whereas the output gap is estimated as the percentage difference 
between realised real GDP and potential output. To obtain a measure of potential 
output, we apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with the smoothing parameter set at λ = 
1600) on ex-post real GDP8.  
 
[Insert Chart 2] 
 
3.2.  Data analysis 
 
A closer look at the data in Chart 2 reveals some important differences. Over the 
sample period, the ECB Staff projections on inflation and real GDP are on average close 
to 2%. Despite the fact that actual inflation was on average above target by one half of a 
percentage point, expectations remained well anchored during the sample period.   In 
addition, expected inflation seems to follow closely the ECB MRO rate9. This is also 
confirmed by the calculated correlation between the ECB interest rate with projected and 
ex-post inflation data (Table 3).  The correlation coefficient between the interest rate and 
projected inflation is above 0.5, which indicates a strong relationship between the two 
variables. On the other hand, only a weak correlation is obtained with ex-post inflation, 
whilst a stronger correlation is obtained with ex-post rather than projected real GDP 
and, consequently, the output growth gap.  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
                                                            
7 For robustness purposes, the analysis was also performed using an inflation target rate of 1.9%. No 
significant difference was detected. 
8 Following the example of Gorter et al (2008), to calculate a reliable measure of the potential output we use 
quarterly data on real GDP from 1995 onwards. For robustness purposes, we have also estimated an ex-post 
output growth gap using the same methodology as for the real-time output growth gap. No significant 
differences were observed in the estimated equations of Section 4. 
9 For a comparison of real-time and ex-post data summary statistics see Appendix C and D. 9 
 
As seen in Chart 2, the relationship between projected inflation and the ECB 
interest rate seems to have broken down during the period 2006(Q4) to 2007(Q2). 
Whereas a decrease in HICP inflation was projected during that time, a sharp increase in 
the ECB interest rate was recorded. This also holds when one compares ex-post inflation 
with the ECB rate. Looking further at the data, the fall in HICP inflation is attributed to 
the energy component of the HICP following the plunge observed in world oil prices at 
the time. The core inflation of the euro area (HICP excluding energy and food prices) on 
the other hand, increased dramatically during that time which could well explain the 
response of the ECB in raising its key interest rate given its objective to maintain price 
stability over the medium term.  
Finally, stationarity of the series is assumed rather than tested. Although 
Gerlach-Kristen (2003) criticised the literature on Taylor rules for failing to account for 
the non-stationarity properties of the data, our sample size is too small to perform unit 
root tests with accurate measurement of critical values and probabilities (see Appendix 
E for a summary of the tests). A limitation of non-stationary data is that regression 
results may be spurious and the implied relationships not genuine. As an alternative to 
unit root tests, a Johansen cointegration test is applied with the trace and maximum 
eigenvalue test indicating, at most, one cointegrating equation for real-time data10 (see 
Appendix F). In this respect, the foregoing regression analysis is assumed to reveal long-
run relationships and OLS estimations are tested for consistency using the Engle-
Granger ADF cointegration test. In addition, there is a strong argument in the literature 
that the data is stationary given the fact that the ECB has always followed a stable 







10 In contrast, when the Johansen cointegration test is applied on ex-post data, no cointegrating relationship 
can be detected at the 5% level (see Appendix F). 10 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1.  Simulated Taylor rule 
The US monetary policy rule originally calibrated by Taylor (1993) assumes 
equal weights for inflation and output deviations from their respective target rates. To 
test whether this calibrated formula also holds for the ECB, monetary policy rules are 
simulated using the Taylor rule weights for ex-post and real-time data. The equilibrium 
nominal interest and inflation target rates are set at 2.0% and 1.8%, respectively. In 
contrast to the US case, under the term of Jean Claude Trichet, the Governing Council of 
the ECB does not seem to have responded equally to inflation and output growth gap 
changes, irrespective of the data sample used (Chart 3).  In fact, the simulated rules 
consistently overestimate the ECB interest rate. In the case of the third quarter of 2008, 
the simulated rate overestimates the ECB rate by 317 basis points when ex-post data are 
employed and by 108 basis points when real-time data are used instead.  
 
[Insert Chart 3] 
 
4.2.  Estimates of reactions functions for the euro area  
 
Given the poor fit of the original Taylor rule to the ECB rate, we proceed with 
estimating a range of reaction functions for the euro area comparing the results obtained 
from both ex-post and real-time data. Columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 4 refer to the 
results when ex-post data are employed and columns (2), (4) and (6) to the results when 
real-time data are used. All equations of Table 4 were estimated by simple OLS11. 
4.2.1. Using ex-post data 
 
Firstly, in order to abstract from the original calibrated values of the Taylor rule, 
a simple Taylor fitted rule is estimated empirically for equation 1 using ex-post data 
                                                            
11 For robustness purposes, the ECB staff projections are treated as endogenous variables and the 
best fit model in column (6) is estimated again using the Generalised Methods of Moments 
(GMM). As shown in Table 5, the GMM results do not differ significantly from the OLS results 
and therefore endogeneity problems do not drive our main results. However, one should be 




providing the baseline specification against which all other estimations are compared.  
The outcomes of the estimated equation are presented in column (1).         
The estimated weights on ex-post HICP inflation and the output gap are -0.06 
and 0.56, respectively. The weight on HICP inflation is statistically insignificant and 
close to zero implying that the ECB did not respond to changes in inflation during the 
period 2004(Q4) to 2008(Q3). On the other hand, the output gap parameter, although 
significant, does not exceed 1. Hence, with ex-post data, the ECB is found to respond 
only to changes in the business cycle. Furthermore, the Engle and Granger cointegration 
test indicates that the residuals are non-stationary implying that the estimated 
relationships of the baseline specification may be spurious.  
To control for the reportedly high serial correlation in the residuals of equation 1, 
we included a lagged interest rate as an additional explanatory variable to account for 
the tendency of central banks to smooth out changes in interest rates as described in the 
literature. The empirical estimates of the partial adjustment model (equation 4) using ex-
post data are reported in column (3). 
The results show that the coefficient of the lagged term is positively significant 
and less than unity, supporting the view of a gradual adjustment in the ECB interest rate 
to a desired setting following a policy shock. In comparison with the baseline equation 
of column (1), the ECB realised inflation parameter reduces further in value and remains 
insignificant, while the output gap parameter increases in value but remains well below 
1. The inclusion of the lagged interest rate term may have improved the fit of the 
regression but nonetheless does not lower the degree of serial correlation in the errors.  
In column (5), an additive dummy variable for the period 2006(Q4) – 2007(Q2)11 
is added to the partial adjustment model to account for the outlier in the residuals of the 
estimated equation in column (3). The coefficient on the dummy variable is positively 
significant which implies that during that period the ECB increased its interest rate by 
154 basis points more than suggested by the level of the realised HICP inflation and 
output growth gap. As mentioned in Section 3, while HICP inflation fell at the time in 
                                                            
11The dummy variable takes the value of 1 for the period 2006(Q4) – 2007(Q2) and zero otherwise. 12 
 
response to the sharp fall in international oil prices, core inflation (defined to be the rate 
of HICP inflation excluding energy and food) continued its upward trend. 
Consequently, the ECB appears not to have responded to this temporary exogenous 
shock, a response which is in line with its primary objective of maintaining price 
stability over the medium term. Nevertheless, the coefficient for inflation is still 
insignificant, albeit positive this time, while a test on the residuals of the equation cannot 
reject their non-stationary nature. 
In general, our estimated results are in line with the existing literature on 
contemporaneous rules for the euro area (see Table 1) and suggest that when ex-post 
data are employed the ECB is found to respond to changes in inflation by an amount 
which is not enough to ensure an instantaneous increase in real short-term interest rates. 
As argued before, this accommodating behaviour results in a destabilising policy with 
respect to inflation.  
[Insert Table 4] 
4.2.2. Using real-time data 
A general critique of the use of ex-post data for the estimation of monetary policy 
rules is that they may differ significantly from the data available to the policymakers at 
the time of forming their monetary policy strategy (Orphanides 2001a, 2001b, 2002). To 
acknowledge this argument, we employ real-time data from the ECB staff projections 
exercises as explained in Section 3.1 and estimate appropriate Taylor rules. 
The results of the estimated forward-looking models differ substantially from the 
ones using ex-post data. Analytically, focusing on the results of the baseline specification 
(column (2)), the coefficients on expected HICP inflation and expected output growth 
gap are both significant and exceed 1, increasing to 2.07 and 1.66, respectively. This 
implies a hawkish response by the Governing Council of the ECB as it appears to 
respond more to changes in expected inflation than to changes in the output growth gap. 
However, a test on the residuals of the baseline equation fails to reject non-stationarity, a 
condition which could influence the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables. 13 
 
By adding an interest rate smoothing parameter (column (4)), the fit of the 
equation improves significantly. At the same time, in contrast to the ex-post partial 
adjustment (PA) model, an Engle and Granger cointegration test on the residuals 
confirms a true long-run relationship between the variables, even though the estimated 
results suggest a higher response to expected changes in the business cycle than to 
changes in expected inflation. The coefficient on the lagged interest term is again 
positive and large, implying that the ECB smoothes its interventions in the money 
market. This policy inertia may also be explained as a moderate response to perceived 
shocks so as to avoid responding to noise in the data (Orphanides, 2003). 
Finally, the estimation of the PA model with the dummy variable (column (6)) 
improves the results further. Comparing ex-post versus real-time data, the response to 
inflation shocks increases to 2.78 while the response to the output growth gap shocks to 
1.46. The estimated coefficients of the smoothing parameter and the dummy variable do 
not differ much from the ones obtained when using ex-post data. Overall, the model’s 
regression fit is good and the residual auto-correlation assumptions are rejected based 
on the standard Breusch-Godfrey LM test. In addition, a true long-run relationship 
cannot be rejected based on the Engle and Granger approach to cointegration, while the 
Cusum of Squares tests confirm the stability of the coefficients. In light of the above, we 
may conclude that the PA model with the dummy variable has the best fit characteristics 
in representing the ECB’s monetary policy and from here on it will be referred to as the 
best fit model.  
[Insert Chart 4] 
Overall, the results of the best fit model suggest that the accommodative behaviour of 
the ECB often implied in the literature can be explained by the use of ex-post rather than 
real-time data13. Irrespective of the Taylor rule specification, the regressions based on ex-
post data point towards a destabilising policy for the ECB, whereby the reaction to 
inflation shocks is insufficient to ensure an increase in real short-term interest rates. In 
contrast, the best fit model based on real-time data, as described above, implies a 
stabilising role of the ECB with the expected inflation parameter being significantly 
                                                            
13 This is consistent with the findings of Gorter, Jacobs and de Haan (2008) and Sauer and Sturm (2007). 14 
 
above 1. At the same time, the significantly positive coefficient on the expected output 
growth gap indicates that the ECB follows a standard “leaning against the wind” policy, 
tightening monetary policy when growth is robust and vice versa. However, following 
the period under Jean Claude Trichet’s Presidency, the ECB appears to have taken a 
hawkish approach in setting interest rates as the Governing Council is more likely to 
react to expectations of a change in inflation than to expectations of a change in the 
output growth gap. What is more, the significance of the dummy variable may imply 
that the ECB is more concerned about changes in the rate of inflation excluding energy, a 
parameter that is more indicative of permanent shocks within the euro area economy 
and more in line with the ECB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability over the 
medium term. 
4.2.3.  The current financial crisis and the implied response of the ECB  
 
A question arises as to whether the ECB has followed the previously estimated 
Taylor type rule to form monetary policy at the time of the financial crisis or whether it 
deviated from its previous practices. In this section, we use the best fit model (Table 4, 
column (6)) in conjunction with the ECB staff projections on inflation and real GDP for 
the period 2008(Q4) – 2009(Q4) to provide a rough benchmark of what the stance of the 
ECB monetary policy should have been in the current period of world economic 
recession given its previous profile. In Chart 5 the historical path of the ECB MRO rate is 
plotted against the real-time data for inflation and real output projections with the 
dashed lines used to indicate the post crisis period. The ECB staff predicted a sharp fall 
in inflation and output during the end of 2008 and the first half of 2009 and a slight 
improvement thereafter. The path of the MRO rate confirms our findings that the 
Governing Council of the ECB is more likely to respond to expected changes in inflation 
than to expected movements of the business cycle. In particular, despite expectations of 
significant negative growth in 2009, the interest rate was lowered by a much lesser 
degree in response to a stable and positive inflation profile. 
 
[Insert Chart 5] 15 
 
Using the estimated best fit policy rule and the forecasts of inflation and output, 
the response of the ECB monetary policy is projected five quarters ahead. The 
recommended policy rate is plotted in Chart 6, whilst the forecasted values of the ECB 
MRO rate are presented in Table 4 under column (6)12.  
By the first half of 2009, the actual ECB interest rate was decreased by 325 basis 
points from 4.25% in the third quarter of 2008 to 1.00%, a rate close to the 0.90% rate 
predicted by the estimated Taylor rule. Although actual and implied interest rates 
coincide more or less in value at the end of the first half of the year, the fall in the MRO 
rate should have been smoother based on the ECB past behaviour.  Of course, given the 
profound effect of the crisis on the real economy, it is generally recognised that tough 
and on the spot decisions were mostly needed at the time. For the second half of 2009, 
the fitted ECB rate is close to the zero lower bound. In contrast, the ECB left its MRO rate 
unchanged at 1.00% during the last two quarters of the year and, instead, implemented a 
broad set of non-standard measures to enhance credit support and to ensure the 
maintenance of price stability over the medium term.  Our findings thus leave scope for 
further research on these unconventional non-standard measures to see whether they 
have been enough to counterbalance the monetary policy shortfall arising from a higher 
ECB rate than the one suggested by the ECB’s fitted Taylor type rule. 
[Insert Chart 6] 
In light of the above, we employ a very simple way to measure the effect of the 
unconventional measures by looking at the estimated relationship between the MRO 
rate and the EONIA rate.  
[Insert Table 6] 
                                                            
12 For comparison purposes, out-of-sample forecasts were also performed using ex-post data on HICP 
inflation and real GDP, the results of which are presented in Table 4 under column (5). If the ECB was 
assumed to react on changes to ex-post data then the recommended decrease in the MRO rate should have 
been constrained to just 120 basis points by the end of 2009. Clearly then, it would be considered safe to 
assume that, just as the evidence on its past behaviour suggests, the ECB did not rely on past data 
information to form its monetary policy during the recent crisis period.  
 16 
 
In particular, since changes in the MRO are expected to be firstly transmitted to 
changes in the EONIA, we estimate a simple OLS regression between the EONIA and 
the MRO rate for the period 2004(Q4) – 2009(Q4) (Table 6, column (8)) of the form 
                                       (5) 
where   is estimated at 1.13 verifying the one to one relationship between the two rates, 
as seen in Chart 7. From the same graph, it is easy to see that this relationship broke 
down after the second quarter of 2009 with the gap between the two rates averaging 
approximately 70 basis points. This is also easy to capture in equation 5 by including a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the period 2009(Q2) – 2009(Q4) and zero 
otherwise (Table 6, column (9)). One could assume that the decrease in the EONIA rate 
over and above the decrease suggested by the MRO rate may be attributed to the non-
standard measures. 
[Insert Chart 7] 
The next obvious question is what level of the MRO would have induced the 
observed fall in the EONIA rate during the crisis. From the estimated equation 5 this can 
be easily shown to imply a further decrease in the MRO rate of approximated 70 basis 
points. In other words, had no unconventional measures been adopted, the ECB rate** in 
Chart 6 would refer to the MRO rate that would be necessary to induce an equivalent 
change in the EONIA rate at the end of 2009. 
As stated in the October 2010 ECB Monthly Bulletin, “the strict separation 
between the formulation and implementation of monetary policy as enshrined in the 
‘separation principle’13 was temporarily loosened”. This implies that, despite the fact 
that the ECB’s non-standard measures were taken over and above the standard 
monetary policy measures in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism, they also indirectly influenced the whole spectrum of 
money market instruments at different maturities. In this respect, it seems that the effect 
                                                            
13 The separation principle refers to the strict dividing line that the ECB keeps between monetary policy 
decisions and policy implementation through monetary policy operations. For further analysis, see ECB 
Monthly Bulletin, October 2010. 17 
 
of the unconventional measures on the EONIA rate is equivalent to a reduction of the 
MRO rate from 1.00% to 0.30% by the end of 2009, a rate which is close to the zero lower 
bound suggested by the ECB’s own rule. 
 
  
5.  Concluding remarks and policy implications 
In this paper we estimated Taylor-type rules for the euro area using quarterly 
real-time data for the period 2004(Q4) to 2008(Q3). The sample period covers the term of 
the current President of the ECB Jean Claude Trichet up until the beginning of the latest 
global economic crisis. Unlike other studies, we use real-time expectations utilising the 
quarterly ECB staff projections available at the time of formatting monetary policy 
decisions. Our results suggest that the ECB’s monetary policy framework can be better 
understood when a relationship between the ECB MRO rate and expected inflation and 
o u t p u t  i s  a s s u m e d .  S u c h  T a y l o r  t y p e  r u l e s are compared with a more conventional 
specification whereby the MRO rate is related to ex-post inflation and output data.  
Based on our real-time estimates, we can draw three important economic policy 
conclusions. First, the ECB is found to have a stabilising role in the economy and only 
under the ex-post data model specification is the ECB found to exhibit an 
accommodating behaviour. Consequently, we show that the implied destabilising policy 
of the ECB, often cited in the literature, is due to the lack of a real-time forward-looking 
perspective when estimating Taylor rules.   
Second, the reaction of the ECB is stronger for expected movements in inflation 
than for output implying that, under President Jean Claude Trichet, the ECB’s 
Governing Council is hawkish when setting interest rates.  
The third important policy conclusion that one can draw from our results is that 
the financial crisis has not been an exception for the ECB. Based on out-of-sample 
forecasts for five quarters ahead, if the ECB were to follow its own rule it should have 
reduced its interest rate to the zero lower bound by the second half of 2009. Instead, the 18 
 
ECB maintained its short-term rate constant at 1.00% during that time and embarked on 
a series of non-standard measures to provide support to the financial sector in general.   
A final remark is whether these quantitative easing measures have been enough 
to counterbalance the fact that interest rates remained above this zero threshold level 
during the current crisis. Using a very simplistic assumption that the break found in the 
relationship between the EONIA and the MRO rate during the financial crisis could be 
attributed to the non-standard measures of the ECB, we find the effect of such 
quantitative easing on the EONIA rate to be equivalent to a decrease of the ECB rate by 
70 basis points to 0.30% by the end of the year, a level close to the one suggested by its 
Taylor type rule. A first analysis on the matter thus implies that the ECB’s response to 
the crisis was equivalent to following a simple interest-rate rule as suggested by its past 
behaviour, even though the primary goal of these non-standard measures was to 
support the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a context of dysfunctional 
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Chart 3: Comparison of the ECB MRO rate and the original Taylor type fitted rate 
 
 
Chart 4: A comparison of the fit of the Partial Adjustment equation with dummy 
variable (columns (5), (6)) using ex-post and real-time data 
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Chart 5: ECB MRO rate and ECB staff projections during the period  
2008(Q4) – 2009(Q4) 
 


































































































































































Chart 7: Graphical presentation of the fit of the estimated equation 5  
(Table 6, column (8)) 
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Table 3: Correlation between ECB MRO rate with ex-post and real-time data 
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Table 4: Estimated Taylor type rules, ex-post vs. real-time data;  




Baseline:    (1)  ̂                        ,      
 (2)   ̂           , |Ω             ,  Ω         
PA:    (3)  ̂     1          1            1                  ̂      ,     
     (4) ı̂     1 ρ   α   β E π , |Ω    π     γ  E y   ,  Ω     ρ ı ̂     θ d u m            v   
 
Best Fit:   (5) ı̂     1 ρ  α  1 ρ  βπ     1 ρ  γ y      ρ ı ̂     θdum           ε   
    
                                 (6)  ̂     1               , |Ω                  ,  Ω         ̂                           
Ex‐post Real‐time Ex‐post Real‐time Ex‐post Real‐time
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






















































π* 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80
rr
‐‐ 0.95 0.60 2.20 1.49 1.37 0.74
r* 2.75 2.40 4.00 3.29 3.17 2.54
R 2
‐‐ 0.941 0.552 0.965 0.974 0.976 0.989
RMSE 0.196 0.540 0.144 0.124 0.116 0.078
i
f  2008(4) __ __ 4.16 3.54
i
f  2009(1) __ __ 3.95 2.23
i
f  2009(2) __ __ 3.70 0.85
i
f  2009(3) __ __ 3.45 ‐0.15
i








Table 5: Estimation of partial adjustment model with dummy variable using OLS and 




















































Table 6: OLS estimation results of the relationship between the EONIA and 






(8)                               






































A.  ECB Quarterly Staff projections of HICP inflation, 2004(Q4)-2009(Q4) 
 



















































































































































































































































































2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average time series31 
 













ît E[πt,2] E[y ̃t,2] E[yt,2] y
*
 Obs 16 16 16 16 16
 Mean 3.13 2.17 ‐0.02 1.98 2.00
 Median 3.25 2.05 0.00 2.00 2.00
 Maximum 4.25 3.05 0.45 2.45 2.00
 Minimum 2.00 1.75 ‐0.70 1.30 2.00
 Std. Dev. 0.89 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.00
 Jarque‐Bera 1.95 3.34 0.52 0.52  ‐‐‐
 Probability 0.38 0.19 0.77 0.77  ‐‐‐
πt y ̃t yt y
*
 Obs 16 16 16 16
 Mean 2.45 0.75 2.37 1.49
 Median 2.33 0.69 2.29 1.65
 Maximum 3.85 3.21 3.57 1.95
 Minimum 1.79 ‐1.34 0.94 0.60
 Std. Dev. 0.64 1.59 0.80 0.46
 Jarque‐Bera 3.13 1.61 0.65 1.83
 Probability 0.21 0.45 0.72 0.4032 
 























































































































None 0.733 40.684 42.915 0.082 None * 0.802 45.338 42.915 0.028
At most 1 0.527 19.539 25.872 0.250 At most 1 0.537 19.455 25.872 0.255

















None 0.733 21.144 25.823 0.184 None * 0.802 25.884 25.823 0.049
At most 1 0.527 11.983 19.387 0.417 At most 1 0.537 12.311 19.387 0.387
At most 2 0.376 7.556 12.518 0.290 At most 2 0.360 7.144 12.518 0.330
 Max‐eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon‐Haug‐Michelis (1999) p‐values
Series: MRO rate, ex‐post HICP and ex‐post output gap 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon‐Haug‐Michelis (1999) p‐values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Sample: 2004Q4 2008Q3
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted)
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1
Series: MRO rate, real‐time HICP and real‐time output growth gap 
 **MacKinnon‐Haug‐Michelis (1999) p‐values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
Sample: 2004Q4 2008Q3
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted)
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 Max‐eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon‐Haug‐Michelis (1999) p‐values